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NECROMANCING THE EQUAL RIGHTS 
AMENDMENT 
Brannon P. Denning* 
John R. Vile** 
I 
In 1972, fifty years after an earlier version was first intro-
duced, both houses of Congress approved the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) by the necessary two-thirds vote, and, in ac-
cordance with the Constitution's amendment procedure, sent it 
to state legislatures, where three-fourths of them would have to 
ratify it before it could become the law of the land. 1 As had 
been the contemporary practice, Congress prescribed a seven-
year deadline for ratification. The initial prognosis for the ERA 
was good: of the thirty-two state legislatures that were in session 
in 1972, over twenty ratified the amendment. 2 But ratifications 
soon slowed to a trickle, due in part to social conservatives' deft 
exploitation of public fears about changes that would be wrought 
by an ERA in the hands of an activist judiciary.3 By 1979, the 
Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale. B.A., 
The University of the South, I 992; J.D., The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, I 995; 
LL.M., Yale Law School, 1999. Thanks to Alii Denning, Maria Frankowska, Pat Kelley, 
Ted Kionka, Nick McCall, and Glenn Reynolds for thoughtful comments on an earlier 
version of this paper. 
•• Chair of the Political Science Department at Middle Tcnm:ssee State Univer-
sity. Ph.D., The University of Virginia; B.A., The College of William & Mary. Author of 
the Encyclopedia of Constitucional Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending 
Issues, I789-I995 (ABC-CLIO, 1996). 
I. Sec generally Equal Rig/us Amendme/ll, in John R. Vile, Encyclopedia of Con-
stitutional Amendmems, Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues, I789-I995 at 119-
21 (ABC-Clio, 1996); see also David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the 
U.S. Constitution I776-1995 at 394-419 (U. Press of Kansas, 1996). 
2. Sec Equal Rights Amendmem, in Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amend-
ments at 120 (cited in note I); sec also Kyvig, Amending the U.S. Constitution at 408 
(cited in note 1). 
3. For a description of the campaign mounted against the ERA by conservative 
activist Phyllis Schlally, and aided by Senator Sam Ervin, sec Kyvig, Amending the U.S. 
Constitution at 409-11 (cited in note !). 
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original deadline, only thirty-five of the requisite thirty-eight 
states had ratified. 
Three states shy of ratification, ERA proponents persuaded 
Congress to extend the deadline for ratification until 1982.4 By 
then, however, even ardent supporters were exhausted, while 
ERA opponents were just warming to the fight. To make mat-
ters worse for supporters, five states rescinded their earlier rati-
fications5 (though Kentucky's acting governor purported to veto 
its legislature's vote to rescind). Before the validity of those re-
scissions could be hashed out in the courts, however, the new 
deadline passed and ERA's opponents declared victory. Its pro-
ponents, meanwhile, were left to advance women's rights using 
the Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act's prohibi-
tion of sex discrimination. 
Now, however, because of an extraordinary series of events 
that resulted in the irregular ratification of the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment6 (also known as the "Madison Amendment") 200 
years after it was first proposed, ERA proponents are hoping to 
reanimate the ERA for the proverbial charmed third time. 7 We 
argue here that the Madison Amendment's precedential value 
for the ERA is slight at best, and that, in any event, given the 
4. On the congressional decision to extend the time limit by a simple majority 
vote. sec Kyvig, Amending rhe U.S. Consrirurion at 415 (cited in note 1). 
5. !d. at 414. For contemporaneous comment on the propriety of the extension, 
sec Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Rarificarion of rhe Equal Righrs Amendmem: A Quesrion of 
Time, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 919 (1979); Grover Rces III, Throwing Away rhe Key: The Uncon-
srirurionaliry ofrhe Equal Righrs Amendmenl Exrension, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 875 (1980). Be-
fore the expiration of the extension, one district court held that the extension was void. 
Sec Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981 ). Once the extension had 
passed without the ERA obtaining the requisite number of states for ratification, how-
ever, the U.S. Supreme Court pronounced the case moot and ordered the district court to 
dismiss it. See Narional Org. Women v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982). For a succinct analy-
sis of the various legal issues surrounding the ERA the first time around, sec Laurence 
H. Tribe, 1 American Consrirurional Law§ 1-19 at 102-03 n.48 (Foundation Press, 3d cd. 
2000). 
6. U.S. Const., Amend. XXVII (''No law, varying the compensation for the ser-
vices of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect until an election of Represen-
tatives shall have intervened."). 
7. Sec, e.g., Allison L. Held, Sheryl L. Herndon and Daniclle M. Stager, The 
Equal Rig/us Amendmenr.· Why rhe ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the 
Srares, 3 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 113 (1997); Debra Baker, The Fighr Ain't Over, 85 
A.B.A. J. 52 (1999); Editorial, An Old Idea is New Again, St. Louis Post-Dispatch B6 
(March 8, 2000); Ellen Goodman, Equal Rig/us Amendmem is Not Dead Yet, New Or-
leans Times-Picayune B5 (Feb. 21, 2000); Laura Scott, Another Go-Round for ERA, K,C. 
Star B7 (Feb. 17, 2000); Dru Sefton, Supporrers Work to Revive ERA, USA Today 3A 
(Oct. 22, 1999); Stephanie Simon, Activists Seek to Bring ERA Back to Life, L.A. Times 
AS (Mar. 9. 2000). 
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subsequent history of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, sup-
porters of the ERA will not want to follow that precedent. 
II 
Originally proposed as one of James Madison's original 
twelve amendments,8 ten of which became our Bill of Rights, the 
Madison Amendment provided that changes in congressional 
pay would not take effect until an election had occurred. When 
proposed in 1791, this amendment initially gained the assent of 
only six states; four short of the number needed to ratify (a 
number that increased as other states joined the Union).9 In the 
1870s, when Congress retroactively increased members' salaries 
to $2,500 a year, Ohio ratified the amendment in protest. In 
1978, after decades of rising congressional salaries, Wyoming 
added its ratification, bringing the number to eight. 10 
In 1982, Gregory Watson, a student at the University of 
Texas at Austin, wrote a term paper in which he argued that the 
amendment could still be ratified. Although he received only a 
C for his efforts, 11 he launched a low-keX crusade that mustered 
thirty-two additional state ratifications. 2 In 1992, the national 
archivist in charge of keeping a tally certified that the amend-
ment had been ratified; and in an election year marked by un-
precedented public hostility towards Congress, both houses rati-
fied the certification by lopsided votes-99 to 0 in the Senate, 
and 414 to 3 in the House. 1 
III 
The ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment has, 
not surprisingly, given ERA supporters renewed hope. And why 
not? Proponents can hardly be faulted for asking why the pas-
sage of twenty-eight years should pose a barrier to ratification of 
8. Sec generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rig/us: Creation and Reconstruc-
tion 8-19 (Yale U. Press, 1998) (discussing Madison's amendments not originally adopted 
as part of the Bill of Rights). 
9. See Twenty-Seventh Amendment, in Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional 
Amendments at 323 (cited in note 1); see also Kyvig, Amending the U.S. Constitution at 
461-70 (cited in note 1). 
10. Vile, Encyclopedia ofConstitwional Amendments at 324 (cited in note 1). 
II. Watson's "C" and his subsequent success led one judge to quip, "One wonders 
what a student of Watson's professor would need to do to get an 'A'." Shaffer v. Clinton, 
54 F. Supp. 2d 1014,1016 n.l (D. Colo. 1999). 
12. Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments at 324 (cited in note 1 ). 
13. !d. 
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the ERA when it took 203 years to ratify the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment. 14 But the advocates of this belated ratification 
overlook at least three important distinctions between the ERA 
and the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. 
First, no time limit accompanied the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment; the Equal Rights Amendment, by contrast, has ex-
hausted not one, but two such limits. Many in 1979 questioned 
the propriety of extending the first deadline at all, much less by 
majority vote instead of the two-thirds congressional superma-
14. Professor Tribe wrote that the ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 
··refocused scholarly attention on whether there exist any constitutional limits on the 
amount of time that may pass between proposal and ratification of an amendment"'-
drolly adding that ''[i]f there are to be any such limits, it would seem that the more than 
two-century span represented by the Twenty-seventh Amendment would implicate 
them." Tribe, I American ConstiiUtional Law at 102 (cited in note 5) (footnote omitted). 
Professor Tribe's concern is not an academic one. If, in fact, the ratification of the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment means that no limits exist, then there arc sleeper amend-
ments that could become part of the Constitution. Sec infra notes 19-20 and accompany-
ing text. Though a careful analysis of the various schools of thought is beyond the scope 
of this essay, there arc two main approaches to the issue -the "formalist" model and the 
"contemporaneous consensus" model. 
Walter Dellinger has argued that the legitimacy of constitutional amendments 
should be ensured by a formalistic application of rules by the judiciary. See Walter 
Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 
97 Harv. L. Rev. 386, 432 (1983) ("article V should be viewed as a set of formal rules 
rather than as the embodiment of vague policy objectives"). The "contemporaneous 
consensus" model, endorsed by a plurality of the Court in Dillon v. Gloss, in contrast, 
argues that to be truly effective, ratification "must be sufficiently contemporaneous in 
[the three-fourths majority required by Article V] to reflect the will of the people in all 
sections at relatively the same period, which ... ratification scattered through a long se-
ries of vears would not do." Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368,375 (1921). 
Then the question arises, "Who decides?" Professor Dellinger urged, contra Dillon, 
that the Supreme Court should exercise jurisdiction over such questions. See Dellinger, 
supra. Laurence Tribe, in response, weighed in on the side of judicial abstention, and ar-
gued that Congress should have pride of place in amendment controversies since "[t]he 
resort to amendment- to constitutional politics as opposed to constitutional law-should 
be taken as a sign that the legal system has come to a point of discontinuity, a point at 
which something less radical than revolution but distinctly more radical than ordinary 
legal evolution is called for." Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In 
Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 436 (1983) (footnote omit-
ted). 
The case of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment seems to demonstrate the weaknesses 
of both approaches. Under the "rules" of Article V, Congress did the correct thing by 
certifying the amendment, since it contained no time limit on its ratification and the req-
uisite number of states ratified it. But the fact that such an approach carries with it the 
possibility, which bore fruit in the case of the Madison Amendment, that amendments 
never die, would suggest that formalism can be pernicious-despite the fact that Profes-
sor Dellinger himself thought that the doctrine of desuetude prevented the Amendment 
from being revived. On the other hand, the haste with which Congress certified the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, suggests that it might not entirely take seriously its re-
sponsibility as rderce in those controversies. Sec also John R. Vile, Judicial Review of 
the Amending Process: The Dellinger- Tribe Debate, 3 J.L. & Pol. 21 (1986). 
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jority required to propose amendments. (Proponents defended 
the decision to extend the deadline on the ground that the origi-
nal time limit was placed in the amendment's authorizing resolu-
tion; not in the text of the amendment itself, where it would be 
self-enforcing.) If the first extension was like adding an extra 
quarter to benefit the losing team in a football game, allowing 
ratification efforts to resume twenty years after ERA's apparent 
defeat is like authorizing the losing team to continue a game af-
ter the winning team has left the stadium. 
Second, unlike the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which un-
questionably got more popular with age,15 at least five states at-
tempted to rescind their initial ratification of the ERA, some in 
response to the extension of the initial time limit. 16 Were addi-
tional states to ratify an allegedly revived ERA, a question 
would immediately arise whether those rescissions were valid. 
While pundits debated whether three or eight additional states 
were needed to ratify, more states would likely attempt to re-
scind (though in a post-Ally McBeal world it is difficult to imag-
ine that the prospect of unisex bathrooms-a favorite bugaboo 
of ERA's opponents-would be as effective as a scare tactic this 
time around). 17 State second-guessing of the ERA belies any no-
tion that public opinion has been ineluctably moving in favor of 
ratification. 
The third point is related to the first two. The ERA was 
proposed with great fanfare and was vigorously debated by both 
sides. Proponents had two shots to make their case. For a vari-
15. See Kyvig, Amending 1/ze U.S. Cons1iuaion at 466 (cited in note 1) ("Resent-
ment of federal government spending and the allure of a simple means of chastising the 
people immediately responsible fueled growing interest in Madison's long-dormant pro-
posal. As support in Congress for the balanced budget amendment began to wane, state 
legislative enthusiasm for the congressional pay raise amendment accelerated."). 
16. Simon, L.A. Times at AS (cited in note 7) ("Five states that ratified the ERA in 
the '70s later passed resolutions taking it back."). 
17. Though Held, Herndon, and Stager argue that rescissions arc not valid, they do 
not really explore the arguments for and against, but rather note that it is the subject of 
debate among scholars. Sec Held, Herndon and Stager, 3 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 
at 131-34 (cited in note 7). Professor Tribe, who served as counsel for the National Or-
ganization of Women in their appeal from the decision of an Idaho district court uphold-
ing the validity of its rescission, argues that "the better view ... is that the weight to be 
given to a state's purported rescission of a prior ratification is a political question insepa-
rable from other nonjusticiablc aspects of Congress' supervision of the ratification proc-
ess." Tribe, I American Consliuaional Law at 103 n.48 (cited in note 5). For further dis-
cussion of this issue, sec Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Anicle V: The 
Cons£i£Uiional Lessons of 1/ze Twemy-Sevemh Amendmem, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 725-26 
(1993) (arguing that rescissions are permitted until "the magic number of state ratifica-
tions occurs"). Sec generally John R. Vile, Permiuing Slates 10 Rescind Ralificmions of 
Pending Amendmems 10 1he U.S. Cons£i£Uiion, 20 Publius: J. Federalism 109 (1990). 
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ety of reasons, includinf judicial victories that seemed to render 
the ERA superfluous, 1 they fell short. To allow a third bite at 
the apple for the ERA would suggest that no amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution ever proposed-including the amendment that 
some right-wingers think strips lawyers of their citizenship and 
whose ratification in the early nineteenth century was, they ar-
gue, illegally nullified 19 -could ever be regarded as rejected. 
While the amendment process set forth in Article V of the Con-
stitution was intended to be arduous, it was not intended to be 
eterna/.20 
IV 
Even if the Twenty-Seventh Amendment did set a prece-
dent, those hoping that Fortune will likewise smile on the ERA's 
third bid for ratification should stop to consider what sort of 
precedent was set. Let's assume that the requisite number of 
states could be persuaded to ratify. Let's further assume that in 
an election year, members of Congress could be bullied into ap-
proving certification of the ERA, lest they be tagged as "not get-
ting it." The question remains, "Then what?" If the ERA's 
model for extraordinary ratification is the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment, the answer is "Nothing." No doubt in part because 
of the Amendment's suspect pedigree, the courts and most mem-
bers of Congress have tended to treat the Twenty-Seventh as a 
"demi-amendment," lacking the full authority of the twenty-six 
that preceded it. 21 
18. Sc.:, for example, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,524 (1996) (requiring 
an "exceedingly p.:rsuasive justification" for gender-based governmental action); Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sustaining an equal protection challenge to fed-
eral law allowing male members "automatic dependency allowance" for wives, but re-
quiring wives to prove dependency of husbands); Baker, 85 A.B.A. 1. at 54-55 (cited in 
note 7) (describing the gains made by women in the judiciary). 
19. The argument is made in David M. Dodge, The Missing Thirteenth Amendment, 
available at <http://www.nidlink.com/-bobhard/orig13th.html> (last visited on Oct. 16, 
2000). For an analysis of this case of the "missing amendment," see generally, Jol A. Sil-
versmith, The "Missing Thirteenth Amendment": Constitutional Nonsense and Titles of 
Nobility, 8 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 577 (1999). For a rebuttal (of sorts), sec generally, Rich-
ard C. Green, The Demon of Discord: Ratification and Suppression of the Original Thir-
teenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, available at 
<http://www.nidlink.com/-bobhard/orig13thn:ality.htmb (last visited on Oct. 16, 2000). 
For other amendments that could be revived, sec Paulsen, 103 Yale L.J. at 701-04 (cited 
in note 17). 
20. Quite the contrary. James Madison caution.:d his fellow citizens not to resort 
too frequently to the amending process. Sec Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: 
Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 155, 169-72 (1997). 
21. There arc three reported cases that discuss the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. 
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The only Court of Appeals decision interpreting the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment turned back a congressman's22 
challenge to annual cost-of-living increases (COLAs) automati-
cally given to members of Congress as part of the 1989 Ethics 
Reform Act.23 According to the court's reasoning, the automatic 
increases are not "law[s] varying the compensation" of members 
of Congress.24 Instead, the original act that provided for the an-
nual adjustments was the law; and-assuming as the court did 
that the Twenty-Seventh Amendment applies to laws passed be-
fore its ratification- "the COLA provision of the Ethics Reform 
Act of 1989 is constitutional because it did not cause any adjust-
ment to congressional compensation until after the election of 
1990 and the seating of the new Congress."25 While this may be 
a plausible textual argument, the construction given by the Court 
certainly blinks at the apparent purpose of the Amendment.26 A 
jury-rigged ratification of the ERA might result in its similar 
evisceration by the judiciary that will be called upon to interpret 
it.27 
Sec generally Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Shaffer v. Clinton, 54 F. 
Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Colo. 1999); Boehner v. Anderson, 809 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1992). 
22. Because federal courts will not hear "generalized grievances," or suits in which 
a plaintiffs harm (here, congressional violation of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment), is 
shared by millions of citizens, members of Congress appear to be the only ones possessed 
of the requisite "standing" to challenge the cost-of-living increases for itself in court. 
Sec, for example, Shaffer, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1016-24 (denying standing to taxpayers and to 
state legislator who voted to ratify Twenty-Seventh Amendment; invoking a variety of 
other procedural doctrines including venue and ripeness to avoid decision on the merits 
of claim challenging constitutionality of COLAs). On standing generally, sec Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 55-92 (Aspen, 1997). 
23. Boehner, 30 F.3d at 161. 
24. !d. at 161-62. 
25. !d. at 162. 
26. Though the court held that the 1989 Act was the "law" that authorized the an-
nual COLAs, one might argue that each COLA is a separate appropriation that the Con-
stitution requires to be made "by law." Sec U.S. Cons!., Art. I,§ 9, cl. 7 ("No Money 
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by 
Law .... "). At any rate, the court provides no answer to the argument that allowing a 
congress prospectively to raise tht: salaries of future congresses in perpetuity (all of 
whom can thereafter disclaim responsibility for the salary increases) essentially guts the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment. 
27. Judge Sporkin's district court opinion in Boehner v. Anderson heaps scorn on 
the idea that the Twenty-Sevt:nth Amendment in any way affected the validity of the 
COLAs and the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. St:e Boehner, 809 F. Supp. at 140. Instead, 
Sporkin faulted tht: Founding Fathers for "not spell[ing] out with sufficit:nt clarity how 
important it was to pay our government leadt:rs a decent and adequate compensation." 
!d. "It clt:arly could not have bt:t:n tht: conct:pt of our founding fathers," Sporkin wrote, 
"to provide government 'on tht: cheap."' !d. These observations culminated in a paean 
to the wisdom and couragt: of the Congress for passing and the Presidt:nt for signing the 
1989 Act. Sec id. at 141-42. Judge Sporkin then concluded, without much explanation, 
that the argument that the Amendment rt:quires the separate passagt: of each COLA was 
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The likelihood that the judiciary would ignore the ERA, or 
at least interpret it narrowly, raises a more fundamental question 
about efforts to resurrect it: is it really a good idea to ornament 
the Constitution with amendments that guarantee "rights" in 
high-sounding rhetoric, but that contain little judicially-
enforceable substance?28 The specter of unenforceability has of-
ten been invoked to defeat hortatory amendments whose mean-
ingful enforcement by the judiciary would either prove mischie-
vous or impossible-the balanced budget amendment and the 
so-called victims' rights amendment are two recent examples. 29 
State constitutions, by contrast, are often replete with such con-
stitutional graffiti, which state courts have deemed aspirational 
and thus unenforceable, at least by the judiciary.30 Too many 
such provisions can leave a constitution, in the words of Chief 
Justice John Marshall, "a magnificent structure, indeed, to look 
"an extremely strained reading of the 27th Amendment-a reading for which the plain 
language of the ammdment provides no support." !d. at 142. Judge Sporkin went on to 
cite a case from the D.C. Circuit, decided before the ratification of the Amendment, 
which rejected a challenge to an act allowing congressional delegation of responsibility 
for setting congressional salaries to the President. Sec id. at 142-43 (discussing Hum-
plzrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). ''The 27th amendment,'' Sporkin wrote, 
"does nothing to alter Congress' legitimate delegation of responsibilities to implement a 
duly enacted salary structure and adjustment mechanism.'' !d. at 143. 
Sporkin's observation merely begs the question whether an amendment obviously 
designed to render accountable members of Congress who raise their own pay has any-
thing to say about the ability of Congress to avoid the very accountability the Amend-
ment tries to ensure by delegating that responsibility to the executive branch. There is at 
least a plausible argument that it docs. That Judge Sporkin seemed unwilling even to 
consider those arguments suggests that he did not take the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 
verv scriouslv 
· 28. Sec. generally Citizens for the Constitution, "Great and Extraordinary Occa-
siollS": Developing Guidelines for Coi!Stitutional Change 7, 19-20 (Century Foundation 
Press, 1999) ("The addition of purely aspirational statements, designed solely for sym-
bolic effect, would lead interest groups to attempt to write their own special concerns 
into the Constitution."); J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitwional Amendmems: And Why 
Proposed Environmental Quality Amendments Don't Measure Up, 74 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 245, 275-77 ( 1999) (cautioning against writing aspirational, symbolic measures into a 
constitution); Brannon P. Denning, This Amendment Would be Constitutional Graffiti, 
L.A. Times B9 (Feb. 5, 1997) (pointing out problems of enforceability inherent in the 
proposed Balanced Budget Amendment). Proponents of ERA's ratification often speak 
of its symbolic importance. Sec generally Held, Herndon and Stager, 3 Wm. & Mary J. 
Women & L. at 135 (cited in note 7); Baker, 85 A.B.A. J. at 55 (cited in note 7); Edito-
rial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch at B6 (cited in note 7); Scott, K.C. Star at B7 (cited in note 
7); Sefton, USA Today at 3A (cited in note 7); Simon, L.A. Times at AS (cited in note 7). 
29. For commentary on various symbolic or aspirational amendments, sec Ruhl, 74 
Notre Dame L. Rev. at 246 n.S (cited in note 28). 
30. For a somewhat dated discussion of such provisions, sec generally Walter F. 
Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of Constitutions, 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 54 
(1931). 
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at, but totally unfit for use" 31 -an apt description of some state 
constitutions. 32 
Finally, those pursuing the Madison Amendment model of 
ratification for the ERA do not seem troubled by the effect that 
a successful effort would have on the constitutional amending 
process. If, as scholars suggest,33 ratification of the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment was dubious, at best, should we even con-
template compounding error by pressuring Congress to approve 
yet another product of such an irregular process?34 Are propo-
nents of ratification willing to devote the time and energy neces-
sary to resolve all of the legal controversies swirling around the 
ERA- validity of rescissions, the constitutionality of the 1979 
extension, and the like? What of other proposed amendments 
that have lain dormant? Will we have to deal with them soon, 
too? And what of the various proposals to call constitutional 
conventions of one sort or another? Have enough states called 
for a convention at one time or another to meet Article V's re-
quirements?35 If so, must Congress call one? The presence of 
these and other serious questions should at least give supporters 
pause. 
Of course, supporters of the ERA could always reintroduce 
the Amendment in Congress, get the required two-thirds vote in 
both houses, and then seek ratification by three-fourths of the 
states, just as the Constitution requires. We do not know 
whether there is sufficient support for the ERA to gain such 
constitutional supermajorities or not, but the fact that supporters 
31. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 222 (1824). 
32. See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions 143 (Princeton U. 
Press, 1998) (noting tendency of twentieth-century "interest groups and factions within 
the legislature [toj champion[ I constitutional amendments to enshrine policy decisions in 
the fundamental law, hoping thereby to make it more difficult for them to be over-
turned") (footnote omitted); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in Andras 
Sajo, ed., Western Rights?: Post-Communist Application (Kluwcr Law International, 
1996) (warning emerging democracies that the usc of new constitutions to enshrine a 
"chaotic catalogue of abstractions" would be "a large mistake, possibly a disaster"). 
33. See, for example. Paulsen, 103 Yale L.J. at 678-81,722 (cito.:d in note 17); Wil-
liam Van Alstyne, What Do You Think Abollt the Twentv-Seventlz Amendment?, 10 
Const. Comm. 9 (1993). · 
34. Again, the haste with which Congress approvo.:d the Madison Amendment, de-
spite questions from legal scholars. is perhaps itself evidence that questions ro.:garding the 
amo.:ndment process should not be regardo.:d as nonjusticiable political questions and left 
to the discro.:tion of Congress, as some scholars have suggested. Sec, e.g., Tribe, 97 Harv. 
L. Rev. (cited in note 14). 
35. For a thoughtful discussion of these issues, and a plausible argument that a suf-
ficient number of states have "li\c" petitions for an Article V constitutional convention 
before Congress, seo.: Paulsen, 103 Yale L.J. at 733-35 (cited in note 17). 
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have resorted to constitutional necromancy in their efforts tore-
vive the ERA suggests that even ERA's backers have their 
doubts. If this is the case, then that alone is probably the best 
reason not to short circuit the Constitution's demanding 
amendment process. 
